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Abstract 
This paper draws upon data from an ethnographic study of a UK call centre to investigate the 
claims of efficiency and productivity that underpin service occupations.  Neoliberal ideology 
valorises competition, profitability and the free market, imperatives which filter down to 
organisational level and manifest as the pursuit of efficiency.  The evidence in this paper 
highlights how the call centre’s quest for efficiency is undermined by inefficiencies that are 
inherent in management implementation of work routines designed to maximise efficiency.  
While management practice and automated work routines may not be efficient, they do 
generate specific outcomes; the oppression, abuse and domination of employees both in 
relation to conditions of employment and working conditions.   
 




The original contribution of this paper is to critically analyse the concept of ‘efficiency’ in 
relation to organisational practice.  The call centre purports to offer an ‘efficient’ delivery 
system for customer care, a consolidation of services into one interface of 
telecommunications and information technology, facilitated by the Customer Service 
Representative (Woodcock, 2017; Taylor and Bain, 1999).  However, through evidence 
presented from an ethnographic study of a call centre in the North East of England, this paper 
suggests that the implementation of market ideology at the level of managerial practice fails 
to provide the intended outcomes.  More problematically, the managerialist ethos of 
efficiency and productivity, backed by performance management and target-driven 
processes, invites an approach to employee relations that results in particularly problematic 




Firstly, the paper will outline the imperatives of market ideology and its subsequent retooling 
of management strategy to highlight the quest for efficiency at an organisational level.  
Secondly, the paper will outline the methodology and the case study that underpins this 
paper.  Thirdly, findings from this study will demonstrate what management drivers for 
productivity and efficiency do and do not accomplish.  The pursuit of efficiency engenders 
inherently inefficient practice and simultaneously facilitates abusive and harmful treatment 
of employees.  The conclusion will address some of the issues related to ideological rhetoric 
and reality and how inefficient processes in the call centre relate to neoliberal political-
economic ideology.  This paper utilises an analytical framework comprising the macro, meso 
and micro.  Through discussion of the macro level of neoliberal political economy and 
ideology, the meso level context of organisational culture and management practice, and the 
micro level of individual action and experience, this paper elucidates the relationship between 
ideology and the subject. 
 
Market ideology and the neoliberal ideal 
Debate continues around the historical, epistemological and ontological foundations of 
neoliberalism (Foucault, 2008; Harvey, 2005; Mirowski, 2013).  For Gane (2015), neoliberalism 
is a form of governance that ‘seeks to inject market principles and competition into all aspects 
of society and culture’.  Broadly speaking, it maintains an epistemological and ontological 
understanding of the human subject as rational actor who, through competition and the 
organising logic of the market, rejects conflict in favour of co-operation and mutual interest 
(Gane, 2015; Mirowski, 2013).  This framework underpins the ideological roots of 
neoliberalism; a commitment to free markets, private property and competition best reflects 
human nature and provides the preeminent opportunity to maximise potential and growth 
(Harvey, 2005).  Commitment to free market economics ebbed during the post-war social 
democratic consensus but re-emerged when economic crises in the early 1970s shook the 
foundations of Keynesian polity (Harvey, 2005).  Neoliberal ideology entered the political 
mainstream in the 1980s and fundamentally altered the social, economic and political 
landscape of the UK and elsewhere.  
 
The post-war consensus was ultimately an aberration in the longue dureè of capitalism 
(Piketty, 2014); a brief interregnum of welfarist policy in a historical period underpinned by 
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the tendency for the rate of return on capital investment to exceed overall economic growth, 
leading to profit accumulating amongst the already wealthy.  Bobbitt (2002), on the other 
hand, identifies a clear shift in constitutional framework at the end of the 20th century; the 
nation-state replaced by a market-state less inclined towards mass free public education, 
universal franchise and social security in favour of maximising opportunity, privatising public 
services and ensuring democratic procedures are less influential and more responsive to the 
market.  In different ways, each suggests a shift in logic towards the end of the 20th century 
that favours market forces and the imperatives of capital (Harvey, 2010).  Streeck (2016) has 
indicated that the dynamic tension between capitalism and democracy has created a 
problematic contradiction whereby the market is prioritised over the public; the current 
‘consolidation state’ (Streeck, 2016) of austerity (Stuckler and Basu, 2013) may generate 
harmful consequences for the UK’s citizenry but is entirely in keeping with the need to service 
the market first. 
 
The macro level of neoliberal market ideology travels down the slope of social structure and 
permeates managerial culture and organisational logic at the meso level (Lloyd, 2013).  
Organisational culture and management practice have been retooled in order to ensure the 
hegemonic logic of neoliberal market ideology is embedded in practice.  This is visible in a 
wide array of examples including the criminal justice system (Whitehead, 2015), education, 
health care, the service economy (Ellis and Taylor, 2006), and manufacturing.  The 
implementation of market ideology at the managerial meso level requires the adoption of a 
new set of practices and imperatives reflective of what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) call the 
‘new spirit of capitalism’.  For profitability to be realised at organisational level, managerialist 
philosophy has increasingly become concerned with efficiency, just-in-time delivery and lean 
workforces, overseen by targets and performance management (Lloyd, 2013, 2018; 
Whitehead, 2015; Taylor and Bain, 1999).  In this context, the call centre is emblematic of the 
quest for efficiency and profitability (Kinnie et al, 2008); as such, the following section will 
explore the call centre literature in detail.   
 
What we know about call centres 
Call centre research principally focuses on organisational structure and management strategy 
along with the impact of work processes on employees.  Deery and Kinnie (2002) classify call 
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centre research into four categories (also Lloyd, 2016).  Firstly, the characteristics and 
organisational composition (Taylor and Bain, 1999) of the workplace include a number of 
studies portraying call centres as low-paid, stressful working environments where a 
controlling system of technological and human monitoring limits autonomy (Bain and Taylor, 
2002; Townsend, 2005).  Attempts to identify ‘call configurations’ that differentiate ideal 
types of call centre (Glucksmann, 2004) indicate further similarities and differences.  Skill 
levels are regularly contested; some argue call centres are relatively low-skilled (Lloyd and 
Payne, 2009) whilst others acknowledge the complexity of operations (Russell, 2008) or the 
requirement to use ‘cognitive’ (McFadden, 2015) or ‘emotional’ (Deery et al, 2002) labour. 
 
Secondly, the choices and strategies of management emphasise quantity versus quality 
(Robinson and Morley, 2006) and workflows or management practices tied to the logic of 
productivity and realisation of targets (Bain et al, 2002; Kinnie et al, 2008).  Research has 
identified ‘scientific management’ techniques of speed-up and control through technology 
(Deery et al, 2002), what Brown et al (2011) term ‘digital Taylorism’, as well as cultural control 
through recruitment of the ‘right people’ (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002; van den Broek, 
2004).  Fleming and Sturdy (2011) identify a control strategy encouraging workers to ‘be 
yourself’, creating a ‘fun’ environment which masks a controlling work process, whilst 
Brannan (2015) employs Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence to elaborate on processes 
of domination and subordination linked to retention strategies.   
 
Thirdly, call centre literature focuses on the effect of work, citing a catalogue of physical and 
psychical hardships (Deery et al, 2002; Holman, 2003; Wegge et al, 2010).  These work 
processes are incongruous with good health and well-being (Taylor et al, 2003); employees 
suffer from physical problems associated with prolonged sitting, extended use of headsets 
and screens and the psychical problems associated with this kind of emotional labour 
(Hochschild, 2003).  Finally, employee response has been a prominent avenue of research 
(Mulholland, 2004; Sarkar and Charlwood, 2014; Townsend, 2005).  Literature focuses on 
resistance within the labour process and the role of unions within the sector, highlighting 
continuities with existing labour process theories to identify areas of solidarity and potential 
sites of resistance.  However, call centre workers often know they are being exploited but 
continue to participate in the labour process anyway (Lloyd, 2017).  This requires us to rethink 
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the relationship between the subject and ideology before we can assert the presence of 
‘resistance’.   
 
Much of the call centre literature fails to connect organisational practice, management 
attitude and employee well-being within a broader framework of politics and economics.  
There are some notable exceptions (Brophy, 2010; McFadden, 2015).  Hill (2015) and Brophy 
(2010) place the call centre within the framework of ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2009).  
Call centre workers, programmers, financial traders, hospitality and service workers, carers 
and others draw upon cognitive potential to create value (Hill, 2015).  This pulls one’s 
subjectivity into the labour process in a way that often generates emotional and psychical 
exhaustion.  However, much of the literature remains rooted in organisational structure, 
management practice and labour process.  The call centre can act as a case study of 
neoliberalism’s ideological and material impact on human subjects and organisational 
structures – a case study that meshes macro, meso and micro dimensions.  If the prevailing 
ideology valorises profitability and competition, and management attempts to achieve this 
through targets, performance management and the pursuit of ‘efficiency’, we can investigate 
its impact in practice. 
 
Methodology 
Data were collected through covert participant observation in a call centre in North East 
England and interviews with co-workers and call centre workers.  Sociology has a long 
tradition of utilising ethnography in the workplace (Beynon, 1973; Ho, 2009; Winlow, 2001).  
Ethnographic methods often draw criticism for offering macro-level conclusions based on 
micro- or meso-level empirical data.  However, ethnography can connect the micro, meso and 
macro, across a range of fields and disciplines (Burawoy, 1998).  Whilst some suggest that 
single-site studies should focus on, for example, the organizational context of an institution 
without raising questions about the nature of the labour process, ethnography can offer an 
extended case method (Burawoy, 1998) drawing on external factors, wider political and 
economic contexts.  Within the critical realist tradition, identifying the empirical reality of a 
single site serves as a starting point; using the single site as a gateway to uncovering 
underlying structures and processes that shape socio-economic, political, ideological and 
subjective reality (see Bhaskar, 2010; Collier, 1994).  Philosophically, the ethnographic 
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method allows for the identification of the Hegelian ‘concrete universal’; a kernel of truth or 
reality in a particular location or environment that provides an intellectual bridge to the 
universal or macro.  Participant observation in this case allows us to look critically at how 
workplace discourse of efficiency, productivity and targets impact upon the reality of call 
centre life and connect to wider ideological belief in the market, growth, and competition.   
 
The research aims of uncovering daily practice, organisational structures and logic, 
management strategy and culture, and employee attitudes were best achieved through 
participant observation.  Covert research is, as Calvey (2008: 908) notes, ‘neither an ‘anything 
goes’ nor a ‘one size fits all’ policy but what is appropriate in that setting’.  As Fine and 
Shulman (2009) indicate, every job or organisation has practices, techniques and strategies 
for doing things that they will avoid showing to outsiders.  Only insiders will learn how an 
organisation functions, so honesty about the true research purpose may preclude entry. As 
such, ethical clearance was obtained and the participant observation was conducted covertly. 
I applied for a job at Call Direct, and successfully negotiated processes of recruitment and 
training before spending six months as a Customer Service Representative (CSR) on the 
Internet Plus broadband contract.   
 
The literature on covert research often focuses on ethical issues around informed consent 
(Cho and Trent, 2006; Zavisca, 2007).  All social research exhibits a continuum of disclosure 
and concealment which is not to say that covert ethnography is exempt from questions of 
consent but does problematise the seeming binary options of ‘honest’ (overt) and ‘deceptive’ 
(covert) research (Herrara, 1999). The demand for informed consent before participation 
presupposes that the participant can be fully informed of the research aims and objectives, a 
proposition that is often unrealistic and, sometimes, prohibitive towards inclusion and 
recruitment of participants and their contribution to the study (Zavisca, 2007).  More 
importantly, the ethical questions attached to social research take place in the field rather 
than the design phase of a project (Calvey, 2008).  Ethics, in the broader sense of a moral 
responsibility for another and a commitment to prevent harm, should guide decision-making 
in the field. In this sense, in the field situated ethics are perhaps more realistic than attempts 
to ‘design out’ risk factors at the planning stage.  At times, the exclusion of data was regarded 
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as the right thing to do, based on a number of factors including context and a responsibility 
to individual participants. 
 
Interview data with co-workers supplemented ethnographic data.  I engaged around 70 
employees in short discussions during field work, held informal discussions with around 30 
employees and followed up with 15 semi-structured, recorded interviews.  These interviews 
included full disclosure of the research aims and objectives.  Consent was recorded before 
interviews with clear guidelines about involvement in the study and rights to withdraw 
consent at any time after the interview.  The ethnography positively facilitated the interview 
process; co-workers knew I had done the job, had been subject to seemingly arbitrary 
decisions from managers, had been shouted at by irate customers, and could empathise with 
what might, to an outsider, seem like a trivial matter that held great significance for the 
employee.  Furthermore, the interviews served to substantiate the ethnographic detail.  As a 
full participant in the call centre, engaged in the job, at times my role blurred between 
‘present’ and ‘observant’, as well as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ (Fine and Shuman, 2009).  Events, 
conversations and experiences written up in field notes could be interpreted subjectively 
therefore interviews served to corroborate and challenge my field notes and knowledge of 
the research location.  Informants were aged between 18 and 30, split evenly across gender 
lines and were a mix of British White and British Asian.  All worked full time for the National 
Minimum Wage and are anonymised here (as are Call Direct and Internet Plus).  
 
Managerial strategy and the pursuit of efficiency 
Call Direct is an outsourced call centre operation.  With several hundred employees across 
two sites, Call Direct provides facilities and staff to a range of clients who contract out their 
customer service and technical support functions (Lloyd, 2013).  The main site in this study 
had a number of floors, each devoted to a different client.  Employees worked exclusively for 
one client.  Call Direct provided services for a mobile phone operator, two broadband clients 
and a TV subscription provider.  Each contract came with specific demands; Call Direct agreed 
to satisfy those demands and manage the overflow from the client’s own in-house customer 
service operation.  Rather than bearing the infrastructure and labour costs, companies  
outsource call centre operations to providers such as Call Direct to ensure short-term 
efficiency (Kinnie et al, 2008).  In this study, Call Direct ‘sold’ its infrastructure, services and 
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manpower to Internet Plus, a broadband provider, by guaranteeing the resources and 
capability to manage Internet Plus’s customer service and technical support requirements.   
 
This configuration is not uniform across a differentiated call centre sector (Glucksmann, 
2004).  Third-party providers engage in a highly competitive market and win contracts by 
appearing to guarantee anything the host company requires.  The logic of neoliberalism 
centres around profitability and competition and at a managerial level, this manifests as the 
pursuit of efficiency and productivity.  Call Direct competes with other outsource call centres 
but the ‘coercive laws of competition’ (Marx, 1990 [1867]) require it remains profitable or 
fails within an aggressively competitive marketplace.  The managerial push for efficiency and 
productivity, or at least the offer of efficiency and productivity to lure clients, was clear in 
principle but in practice drove a set of behaviours that caused problems for Call Direct.  
Throughout the participant observation, low-level staff discontent was obvious on an almost 
permanent basis but occasionally flared up.  This usually happened when shift changes were 
announced at short notice.  Tracy was a HR manager at Call Direct, responsible for mapping 
shift patterns based on client demand, 
 
“Because it’s an outsource, it tends to be a lot of overspill from the main call 
centre, so they give you an estimate of the calls that are expected and they’ll tell 
you when you’re likely to receive them that day.  Then you have to try and map 
that and say how many staff do we need available to do it.” 
 
“We were very much driven by what the client would give you in terms of the calls 
they would give you, you couldn’t say, ‘well, I’m sorry, I can’t staff at that time of 
the day’, they would say, ‘that’s your problem, that’s what you’re paid for’.  That 
often meant that we were giving, I’d say probably, sometimes unreasonable shifts 
to staff, we were asking them to compensate for the poor call flow, but it was 
expected because it is an outsourced call centre, they would tend to say, ‘we’ll 
bend over backwards for whatever the client wants.” 
 
Tracy suggested that staff discontent often stemmed from an imperative to satisfy client’s 
needs at any cost.  Employees suffered because shifts changed at short notice.  CSRs were 
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frequently overworked because Call Direct often guaranteed management of greater call flow 
than staff capacity could successfully discharge. The competitive market for outsourced call 
centres meant guaranteeing efficiency.  Tracy suggested, 
 
“Put some proper processes in place, start to treat the people better, have more 
thought for the fact people have to plan their lives, and that has to be down to 
the negotiations with the client, they shouldn’t just bend over, their staff wouldn’t 
put up with it so why should anybody else?  There has to be reasonable 
discussions up front, not just saying yes we’ll deliver what you want and trying to 
work out whether it’s actually possible or not.” 
 
“I think they’ve gone through phases where they’ve tried to do things the right 
way then another contract has come along which has forced them to do things 
very quickly and they’ve slipped back into their old practices, instead of being 
consistent saying ‘this is how we want to do things, no matter what’, they just end 
up cutting corners.” 
 
Outsourced call centres like Call Direct must ruthlessly pursue efficiencies to remain viable in 
a competitive market (Harvey, 2005), an imposition that adversely affects employees.  Fearful 
of losing lucrative contracts, outsourced call centres often promise the world and worry about 
delivery afterwards.  Changing shift patterns at short notice, restructuring teams, and 
demanding higher productivity are inevitable by-products of the quest to remain competitive.  
However, the practices Tracy describes seem to indicate a lack of efficient management; it 
appears contingent and flexible, often pursued under duress and without strategic intent.   
 
Targets have become the master-signifier of efficiency within managerialist manifestations of 
neoliberal polity (Whitehead, 2015).  The pursuit of efficient practice and increased 
productivity can be measured statistically and used to performance manage employees to 
ensure they meet demand.  Call centre management strategy focuses upon productivity and 
overwhelmingly uses targets as the measure of this success (Bain et al, 2002).  This has specific 
implications for work routines on the call centre floor.  CSRs at Call Direct were aware of 
targets; average handling times for calls, number of calls taken, and percentage of time spent 
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in wrap [finished a call but writing notes on the customer’s account] or idle [signed in but not 
available].  Statistics were displayed around the call centre; white boards were placed next to 
each ‘pod’, a large oval table comprising twelve individual workstations, with handling times 
exceeding the average written in red ink for visible scrutiny.  Seeing red figures next to one’s 
name, knowing everybody else could see it, generated anxiety and embarrassment.  When 
call volume rose, team leaders were expected to pressurise staff; if the percentage of 
customers who hung up before speaking to a CSR exceeded an arbitrary target, it reflected 
badly on Call Direct.  Pressure mounted and many CSRs reported growing tension.   
 
This generates an inevitable outcome; CSRs cut corners to satisfy demand for quick ‘wrap up’ 
by putting ‘one-liners’, a single line of information, on a customer’s account.  Typically, notes 
written on an account should be detailed, including a summary and resolution allowing the 
next CSR dealing with a query to pick up the story quickly.  Numerous contacts indicated that 
sometimes CSRs would write nothing.  This increased stress and frustration as customers had 
to recount details of previous calls in order for a CSR to catch up.   During busy periods, CSRs 
did not have time to listen to a long summary; team leaders were pressuring them to ‘wrap 
up’.  The customer often reacts negatively when asked to recapitulate previous conversations, 
particularly if an issue remained unresolved.  This commonly resulted in an angry call, further 
raising stress and pressure on the CSR.  The drive for efficiency, the management practice of 
pushing CSRs to wrap up quickly led some to cut corners which served to redirect or delay 
rather than resolve problems.   
 
Repetition is crucial to the work process (Mulholland, 2004).  The division of labour ensures 
CSRs repeatedly dealt with the same type of call.  In dealing with billing queries all day, 
autonomy is emphatically reduced.  It becomes second nature to ask the right questions in 
the right place, use the correct scripted ‘open’ and ‘close’.  The comparison between the 
assembly-line of industrial modernity (Beynon, 1973) and the ‘assembly line in the head’ 
(Taylor and Bain, 1999) is clear. Repetition and division of labour also generate inherently 
inefficient processes and practices.  Customers connected to the wrong department wait on 
hold while they are transferred or told to ring back and select a different menu option.  Rather 
than receiving efficient service, customers become increasingly frustrated at being passed 
around.  One evening in Customer Support, my team was quiet and our team leader was busy 
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elsewhere.  Technical Support calls were routed to our team but, lacking technical support 
training and enjoying the quiet shift, the first CSRs to take these calls became unhelpful, telling 
the customer that they had ‘somehow’ come through to the wrong team and needed to ring 
back.  Soon everyone was doing this.  Rather than helping the customer, CSRs refused to 
engage.  Better yet, the Average Handling Time went down as calls were resolved quickly; our 
statistics, at least, were seen to be efficient. 
 
The business model embodying neoliberal tenets of efficiency, productivity and lean working 
often misaligned with the operational model employed by management; seeking to ensure 
productivity and efficiency resulted in practices that delivered the opposite effect (Vidal, 
2009).  Twin management strategies of targets linked to performance-related bonuses and 
electronic surveillance ensure that workers maintain high levels of work (although not 
necessarily high levels of productivity).  In the above example, the electronic system 
recognised we were working but the human aspect of call centre management failed; without 
the team leader’s scrutiny, work avoidance was possible whilst appearing to work efficiently.  
However, poorly performing CSRs faced the humiliation of seeing their statistics displayed for 
public scrutiny.  Call Direct made little or no attempt to help struggling employees.  Utilising 
a Taylorist ‘scientific management’ approach, the call centre sets the pace at a level some can 
achieve and then demands everybody fulfils that target.  CSRs failing to perform will not 
survive.   
 
For some teams, targets are incentivised.  The Customer Care Team (cancellations 
department) received targets for the number of customers retained per week.  Setting targets 
for retention meant Care Team agents would avoid dealing with customers where retention 
would be difficult.  Excuses were made for not taking over calls.  This was a reflection of 
management attitudes towards customer care and retention.  Call Direct and Internet Plus 
believed that customer cancellation reflects poorly on the CSR, shifting responsibility from 
the company to the individual.  Internet Plus believed it reasonable that Ben, a pragmatic Care 
Team agent, ‘saves’ 60% of customers each week.  When successful, Ben’s team were 
rewarded with high-street vouchers.  This guaranteed a consumer experience whilst existing 
outside the pay structure; Call Direct rewarded staff without paying more or reducing targets.  
Sally’s team answered email enquiries and, upon hitting their target, were ‘rewarded’ with a 
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40% increase in their target.  Stagnating wages over the last forty years, coupled with 
increased productivity, have served to work the employee harder without commensurate 
remuneration (Harvey, 2010).  High-street vouchers serve as incentives to work harder 
without guaranteed reward.  Only those capable of hitting targets are rewarded; work 
becomes a field of competition whereby weak and underperforming staff are criticised, 
humiliated and fired whilst the ‘successful’ climb over the bodies of exhausted co-workers 
and dissatisfied customers to win a guaranteed shopping experience.  Embedded 
consumerism is central to contemporary society and our psycho-social make-up (Raymen and 
Smith, 2016); employees compete for high-street vouchers as a reward for meeting targets.  
Co-workers become pitched against each other, not a source of collective strength and 
support (Lloyd, 2017).  It also encourages the ‘wrong’ behaviours, as Tracy points out, 
 
“Because there’s so much emphasis on targets, it drives the wrong behaviours.  If 
you know you’re going to be picked up on your targets, you’d find a way to make 
up your targets whether that gives quality service to the customer or not.” 
 
Cutting corners and sacrificing quality becomes ‘normal’; as long as CSRs demonstrate good 
statistics they will be rewarded or, at least, not punished.  When management valorise targets 
as the embodiment of efficiency and productivity, employees will ‘shadow box’ with the data 
(Winiecki, 2004) in order to present an artificial overview often bearing little resemblance to 
reality and masking the stress, pressure and effort behind achieving an arbitrary level of 
performativity.  The capricious nature of targets drives the wrong behaviours, the quest for 
efficiency disregards quality which engenders a division of labour that often generates 
inefficient service; customers are passed around, told to ring back and CSRs fail to update 
customer accounts, ensuring further inefficiencies in future. 
 
As organisations implement managerial strategies to succeed in competitive markets, 
efficiency and productivity, measured through targets and performance management, 
frequently become the standard approach.  At Call Direct, the evidence suggested that 
routine and practice aimed at the generation of efficiency had a number of consequences 
that actively impeded its ability to achieve efficient and productive practice.  However, this 
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managerial approach also had intentional and unintentional negative consequences for 
employees.   This is the subject of the following section. 
 
Managerial strategy and the accomplishment of harm 
If the evidence above indicates what the managerialist interpretation of ideological tenets 
fails to achieve i.e. efficiency, this section will focus on what it does achieve.  The adoption of 
market ideology, in the form of efficiency and productivity, is a guise to mask the increase in 
abusive and degrading forms of exploitation and control.  This exists on two fronts: the 
conditions of employment and the working conditions experienced on the call centre floor.  
The need for efficiency and productivity, epitomised by ‘lean’ workforces, serves as a 
rhetorical mask that barely disguises the desire to do the minimum; to implement temporary, 
fixed-term, zero-hour contracts, pay the minimum wage, and strip out employment rights and 
protections.  As discussed above, the call centre literature has already demonstrated 
effectively the range of harms, abuses and exploitations involved in both the conditions of 
employment and the labour process.  This section will not cover old ground but instead point 
to a number of examples from this study that identify the problematic aspects of call centre 
work orientated around the need for productivity. 
 
All Call Direct employees assigned to Internet Plus had permanent contracts.  No temporary 
or zero-hour contracts were used and recruitment agencies did not supply Call Direct with 
labour.  However, despite this apparent stability, the balance of power in employment 
relations rested entirely with the company.  Every new recruit was technically under a period 
of probation, officially six months long but in practice a much more malleable deadline.  
During this probationary period, significant leeway existed for the company to terminate 
contracts for those CSRs they felt did not fit or were deemed to be underperformers.  The 
probation ended after a formal meeting with a line manager to review performance, targets 
and call monitoring statistics.  Those deemed to be acceptable were formally retained; once 
statutory benefits such as sick pay now became incorporated into one’s contract.  For those 





All CSRs were informed of the intention to conduct a probationary review after six months 
but during the project, some CSRs with eight or nine months experience acknowledged that 
they still had not received their probationary review and so were still technically ‘on trial’.  
The ability to withhold this review and, consequently, withhold benefits from employees, 
gave the company leverage over its workers.  Whilst ‘good’ employees saw their probationary 
review postponed or ignored, ‘problematic’ employees routinely saw their probationary 
review brought forward, a universal signal to all that the employee would be fired that day.  
In the six months of observation for this project, four of my team members had probationary 
reviews brought forward and each was promptly fired.  The company policy stated that major 
infractions were punishable by immediate termination whilst an accumulation of three minor 
infractions could also trigger dismissal.   
 
Minor infractions were doled out by team leaders for a wide variety of infringements such as 
lateness, leaving one’s terminal without logging the right code on the system, looking at 
external websites on work computers and general behaviour on the call centre floor.  The 
imposition of these infractions often depended upon the team leader and the CSR involved 
and was thus an arbitrary application of company policy.  One CSR, Ollie, was 19, incredibly 
naive, impulsive and routinely drew attention to his behaviour at work.  He had been saved 
by his team leader early in his employment after being caught ‘dropping calls’, hanging up on 
customers to avoid dealing with their enquiries.  However, after five months at Call Direct his 
anger at a management decision to reject an annual leave request and his determination to 
fix it immediately saw him accrue three minor infractions in under an hour.  His previous team 
leader had been newly appointed and keen to show her ability to manage troublesome staff 
so had fought to keep Ollie as she thought she could mould him into a model employee.  His 
new team leader had no such intention. Ollie’s behaviour had drawn the attention of the floor 
managers so his probationary review was arranged and he was sacked.  These examples 
demonstrate how contractual status and the conditions of employment place the employee 
in a position of weakness.  Their ‘probationary’ period coupled with the list of minor 
infractions that could trigger dismissal ensured that CSRs were insecure and precarious. 
 
These conditions of employment inform the working conditions under which CSRs labour.  
Some call centres actively incorporate high turnover into management strategy (Wallace et 
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al, 2000).  Call Direct epitomised this trend towards a ‘sacrificial’ HR strategy that demanded 
high productivity and high targets without concern for employee well-being; staff are 
disposable, allowed to burn out quickly and leave, easily replaced by new recruits from 
stagnant local labour markets.  On top of burnout, stress and humiliation, an employee 
without control over the pace of work is increasingly susceptible to alienation, particularly in 
forms of affective labour requiring the production and reproduction of emotion (Hochschild, 
2003).  CSRs were encouraged to ‘smile down the ‘phone’.  One team leader remarked, “I 
know it sounds silly but try it; you really do feel in a better mood when talking to a customer 
if you’re smiling.”  The requirement to ‘perform’ on every call was mentally exhausting; 
challenging forms of affective labour, coupled with pressure, tension and stress produced by 
targets and requirements to increase quality and quantity can enervate CSRs.  Hitting targets 
reflects the imperative for profit maximisation.  In an occupation where the performance of 
affective labour is essential in the drive for productivity, it is curious that prevailing 
management practices served to increase tension, pressure and humiliation on staff.  
Humiliation was packaged as motivation. 
 
The ultimate example of dehumanising the employee in the name of productivity involved 
turning toilet breaks into a contested area between management and employees.  The 
electronic system monitors statistics and performance; a CSR must enter a code into their 
‘Aspect’ (the telephone-sized port connecting a CSR to the system) to account for their time.  
‘Idle’ breaks were divided into numerous options; scheduled breaks, ‘admin’ to complete 
paperwork, ‘one-to-one’ for meeting a team leader, and a ‘comfort break’ for using the 
bathroom.  The electronic system recorded how long each employee spent in the bathroom.  
At Call Direct, team leaders were required to account for their team’s statistics and some 
were reproached for the number of ‘comfort breaks’ taken.  Each CSR was to restrict daily use 
of comfort breaks to 19 minutes or less.  Teams were criticised for the use of comfort breaks, 
adults were chastised for how long they spend in the toilet.  One respondent, Liam, 
questioned this lack of autonomy, 
 
“In terms of...the job you’re doing, it is very structured as we’ve said, so it’s almost 
like...you want some personal freedom which is when you want to go to the toilet, 
or whatever, or the time you take to do certain things.  When that is 
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micromanaged down it is basically taking away the last elements of personal 
freedom that you have.” 
 
The early shift (7am – 3.30pm) at Call Direct had only one team on the floor.  One morning 
we quickly had more than ten calls waiting leading to inevitable pressure to wrap up quickly 
and reduce the queue.  One co-worker asked to use the bathroom, the team leader replied, 
“no, I’m sorry but there’s too many calls waiting”.  The CSR remained seated and continued 
working.  For young people engaged in insecure, flexible forms of affective labour in a locale 
with limited job opportunities, indignities are borne without question because there are few 
realistic alternatives.  When the most basic human functions become a source of contention 
and CSRs are routinely denied permission to use the toilet, it highlights the level of 
micromanagement employed in the pursuit of productivity.  Call Direct’s management style 
of targets and monitoring made the bathroom a contested area, extending control to basic 
bodily functions; CSRs were denied permission to use the bathroom because, given the 
competitive nature of the market, the call centre worried more about hitting targets and 
retaining clients than the dignity of their staff.   
 
Although this section has not substantively focused on issues and examples of labour process 
and control (see Lloyd, 2017) or monitoring and performance management (see Lloyd, 2013), 
it has identified a number of problematic outcomes for call centre employees.  These 
outcomes stem from a managerial emphasis on productivity, flexibility and efficiency; 
employment contracts that allow the company to monitor and performance manage staff yet 
retain the ability to terminate those who underperform or fail to conform.  The demand for 
emotional labour places strain on the employee expected to perform and invest one’s own 
subjectivity into the labour process, for little reward or thanks.  The use of targets to ensure 
profitability and efficiency drives a labour process and micro-management strategy that not 
only actively acknowledges and shrugs off the likelihood of burnout and turnover but 
prevents employees from performing essential bodily functions.  The requirement for 
efficiency drives management practices that directly impact upon the physical and emotional 
well-being, dignity, and objective material existence of employees.  The final section will 





This evidence presented above encourages a critical investigation of the pursuit of efficiency 
and productivity that characterises call centre management.  If hegemonic ideology has a 
causative influence on culture and practice, then neoliberalism and its valorisation of 
profitability, competition and free markets directly impacts upon the managerial approach of 
organisations such as Call Direct.  How successfully these ideological tenets translate into 
management practice and organisational culture is demonstrated through a series of 
examples that clearly indicate a failure to ensure efficient practice and the realisation of 
productivity.  Managers cut corners to satisfy client demand, employees cut corners to ensure 
targets are achieved.  Whilst performance indicators may represent the appearance of 
productivity and efficiency, the reality is quite different; CSRs find shortcuts to satisfy targets 
but in doing so kick problems down the road.   
 
In some respects, this reflects Streeck’s (2016) assertion that capitalism routinely fails to 
untangle its internal contradictions.  Capitalism’s contradictions have historically created 
problems that it must seek to surmount (Harvey, 2010).  Rather than resolve the 
contradiction, capitalism’s preferred method is to overcome the problem in a way that defers 
to a further future problem.  The expansion of credit to households from the 1980s onwards 
resolved the problem of economic stagnation and wage plateau of the 1970s but created a 
future problem of reckless lending and indebtedness (Streeck, 2016).  This contradiction came 
to a head with the 2007-08 financial crisis; its resolution through the ‘consolidation state’ of 
austerity merely postpones an inevitable future problem.  On a micro level, the CSR will cut 
corners by leaving no note on the account and thus satisfies the immediate problem 
associated with performance and targets but inevitably postpones the ability to resolve the 
customer’s issue as the next CSR to pick up the case is inadequately informed and 
disadvantaged in their attempt to help.  The use of targets and performance management as 
a measure of efficiency inherently generates inefficient practice.   
 
If efficiency and productivity measures are unsuccessful in achieving their intended outcomes 
it then becomes imperative to identify what they do achieve.  This has been covered by the 
call centre literature for two decades and does not require repetition here.  The key question 
is whether the imposition of managerial practice at organisational level is designed to achieve 
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the ideological exhortation for profitability, success and competition, yet fails to achieve this 
in practice, or whether these imperatives and processes reflect other motivations.  Fisher’s 
account of ‘capitalist realism’ (2009) usefully allows us to consider the gap between ideology 
and practice.  The neoliberal imperative embodied at organisational and managerial level as 
efficiency and productivity is unsuccessful in practice but is successful as an ideological 
disciplinary mechanism to control the employee. 
 
The abuse, exploitation and humiliation foisted upon call centre workers in the name of 
productivity and efficiency is not the unintentional consequence of translational difficulties 
between political economic ideology and organisational practice and strategy.  It is a 
deliberate attempt to discipline and control the employee.  The narrative of efficiency and 
productivity provides an opportunity for management to squeeze profit from employees, 
control and monitor CSRs, speed up and automate work processes, and performance manage 
and turnover underperforming or burned out recruits.  Fisher (2009) suggests that 
neoliberalism has invaded the social, personal and political psyche to convince us that there 
is no alternative to free market capitalism.  In the absence of an alternative, all that remains 
is the careful and efficient administration of the status quo.  The market, as the primary 
mechanism for social organisation under neoliberalism, pits organisations in direct 
competition and the profit motive at the heart of capitalism compels companies to seek any 
and all ways to ensure profitability.  In this sense, ‘efficiency’ is about maximisation of 
resources in the pursuit of profit, not the pursuit of excellent customer service.  The shift in 
power from labour to capital, facilitated by the state’s protection of market functions (Harvey, 
2005; 2010), leaves employees exposed to these iniquities.  However, as individual freedom 
also lies at the heart of neoliberal ideology, a collective response to these conditions is 
negated (see Lloyd, 2017).   
 
Conclusion 
Within the call centre, work intensification, automated individualised labour processes, 
personal targets and performance management in the name of efficiency combine with 
precarious and insecure conditions of employment to implement a disciplinary form of 
control on the employee.  The employee as a subject of ideology reproduces these restraints 
and controls by ‘playing the game’, working harder and faster, competing against co-workers 
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for rewards and ensuring they can pay the bills at the end of the month.  The call centre work 
process is inherently inefficient but is successful as a tool of disciplinary control as individual 
freedom, fuelled by competition and precarity, drives the employee down an avenue that 
accepts and reproduces a problematic work process.   
 
As the evidence in this paper has demonstrated, the call centre operation invokes the spirit 
of efficiency, productivity and effectiveness in its managerial ethos and labour process.  In 
reality, it fails to deliver efficiency or productivity as the process itself is flawed; for example, 
the use of targets ensures that employees jettison good practice in favour of satisfactory 
performance indicators.  The quest for efficiency undoubtedly damages the oppressed call 
centre worker but it also ensures an environment where organisational practice, 
management strategies and conditions of employment prevent the worker from seeking 
redress or change.  The wider ideological significance of capitalist realism lies in its insistence 
that there is no alternative.  The worker with responsibilities cannot afford to rock the boat 
and challenge the management practices that creep in under the guise of ‘efficiency’.  
Employees oppressed and abused in the name of efficiency may recognise this as self-evident 
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